The Claimant’s father and litigation friend alleged that the medical practitioners treating his son were negligent in not promptly carrying out an ultrasound on his head, after he had been admitted to hospital with head injuries. The judge found that the expert for the Claimant was, to an extent, seeking to fight his corner rather than taking a dispassionate approach to the issues raised.

The Claimants alleged that dust, noise and odour emitted by the defendant’s factory over a prolonged period constituted a legal nuisance. The judge was critical of the Claimants’ experts for departing from the initial common approach when the initial results had been adverse to their clients’ case.

Familiar to all experts, this case illustrates how personal injury claimants can attempt to maximise their claim by dishonestly reporting symptoms and disabilities. There are few honest and experienced experts who can say that they have never been deceived by a personal injury claimant. The more experienced will avoid saying that the claimant appeared genuine, that they had no reason to doubt their account, or that they appeared to be honestly reporting their difficulties.

What assisted the court in this case was the findings of the experts that the claimant’s presentation was not supported by the objective findings.

This case has a more important message. An expert, having given an opinion that he has no reason to doubt a claimant’s veracity (not just a conclusion on the balance of probabilities, but beyond reasonable doubt), when he comes to change his mind, is under a duty to the court positively to make clear that he no longer holds that opinion. It is not sufficient to leave the judge to read between the lines. 

Debbie O'Connell v The Ministry of Defence [2025] EWHC 2301 (KB)

The person insured by the defendant drove his motorcycle into the pursuer’s parked lorry causing the pursuer, who claimed he was standing on the steps of the lorry on one foot and leaning on the cab, to allegedly lose his balance and suffer injuries. The defendant led an expert witness, Mr H, who presented himself as a Forensic Engineer, and the pursuer an Orthopaedic expert, Mr S. 

The Sherrif concluded that he could not afford Mr H’s conclusions more than minimal weight because of a failure of methodology. Mr H had also expressed his conclusions in terms that gave the appearance that he was the decision-maker and made concessions during cross-examination. The Sherrif found Mr S to be a credible and reliable witness overall but noted that he was not clear when describing his fee arrangements. 

The detail of this judgment is for the specialists. It illustrates the challenges of proving that an infection has been caused by food poisoning at a hotel, and specifically the relevance of evidence as to other outbreaks in the area, trips out of the hotel, the records of illnesses suffered by other residents and audits of hotel food standards. The two learning points are oft-repeated ones and in this case of particular importance as some of the judge’s decisions depended on which expert’s evidence to accept.  

Rawson v TUI UK Ltd [2025] EWHC 2093 (KB) 

The claimant alleged that the vibrating tools he used while employed by the defendant caused Hand-Arm Vibration Syndrome. The judge criticised one of the medical experts for looking for answers that supported his strong views on the subject, rather than obtaining a reliable history from the claimant.

The Claimant brought a claim for compensation in the UK after he was hit by an uninsured driver while on holiday in Mallorca and suffered major injuries, including severe brain injuries. The court found the evidence of several of the experts to be unsatisfactory leading the judge to preface his assessment of the expert witnesses with the observation that “[t]he court is not bound by the conclusions of any expert if it offends logic and common sense. We do not have trial by experts.”

The Claimant brought a claim of clinical negligence after suffering a rare but serious complication (anal stenosis) of an operation performed by the Defendant to surgically remove her haemorrhoids. The judge found that the evidence of the Claimant’s expert was based on limited experience or expertise. There were also several instances where he had not acted in accordance with his duties as an expert.

The Claimant sought damages for clinical negligence from the Defendant who, she asserted, failed to diagnose red flag symptoms of cauda equina syndrome at a face to face consultation. The Claimant’s neurorehabilitation expert prepared his reports, engaged in an expert discussion, and signed the Joint Statement, without having seen the Claimant’s witness statement or the reports of other relevant experts.

Although this is a case of alleged dental negligence and can be usefully read in full not only by dental experts, but by dentists, oral surgeons and students of dentistry, it is also of some general significance not just for experts who provide evidence in Scotland, for whom the exposition of Scots negligence law is invaluable and civil procedure significantly different, but for lessons about expert evidence in clinical negligence cases generally.

Gallagher v Clement (National Personal Injury Court) [2025] SCEDIN 035