The person insured by the defendant drove his motorcycle into the pursuer’s parked lorry causing the pursuer, who claimed he was standing on the steps of the lorry on one foot and leaning on the cab, to allegedly lose his balance and suffer injuries. The defendant led an expert witness, Mr H, who presented himself as a Forensic Engineer, and the pursuer an Orthopaedic expert, Mr S. 

The Sherrif concluded that he could not afford Mr H’s conclusions more than minimal weight because of a failure of methodology. Mr H had also expressed his conclusions in terms that gave the appearance that he was the decision-maker and made concessions during cross-examination. The Sherrif found Mr S to be a credible and reliable witness overall but noted that he was not clear when describing his fee arrangements. 

This is an important judgment for obstetricians as it shows in precise detail how the court, relying on not just the experts’ evidence but a critical analysis of the literature on which they relied, decided whether the claimant would have avoided developing HELLP had she been advised to take 75 mg aspirin at 12 (or 14) weeks instead of at 23. Twelve publications were put under the microscope and considered also in the light of research concerning the relative value of aggregate data and individual participant data.

Although the issue in this case was the prevention of HELLP, it may be an important judgment to consider in pre-eclampsia cases.

De Francisci v Hampshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (County Court, Basingstoke sitting at Southampton, 9 May 2024) Case No: F16YM828

The detail of this judgment is for the specialists. It illustrates the challenges of proving that an infection has been caused by food poisoning at a hotel, and specifically the relevance of evidence as to other outbreaks in the area, trips out of the hotel, the records of illnesses suffered by other residents and audits of hotel food standards. The two learning points are oft-repeated ones and in this case of particular importance as some of the judge’s decisions depended on which expert’s evidence to accept.  

Rawson v TUI UK Ltd [2025] EWHC 2093 (KB) 

The Claimant sought damages for clinical negligence from the Defendant who, she asserted, failed to diagnose red flag symptoms of cauda equina syndrome at a face to face consultation. The Claimant’s neurorehabilitation expert prepared his reports, engaged in an expert discussion, and signed the Joint Statement, without having seen the Claimant’s witness statement or the reports of other relevant experts.

Although this is a case of alleged dental negligence and can be usefully read in full not only by dental experts, but by dentists, oral surgeons and students of dentistry, it is also of some general significance not just for experts who provide evidence in Scotland, for whom the exposition of Scots negligence law is invaluable and civil procedure significantly different, but for lessons about expert evidence in clinical negligence cases generally.

Gallagher v Clement (National Personal Injury Court) [2025] SCEDIN 035

The judge found that the Defendant’s expert in snowmobile operations was a partial witness who acted as an advocate for the Defendant’s case. He not only ignored the Claimant’s evidence and adopted the snowmobile guides’ evidence, but positively sought to persuade the Court to find facts in the Defendant’s favour.

In short, the case illustrates a very common situation in which, on the basis of what is often an appropriately diagnosed psychological condition or mental disorder, it is asserted that a litigant is not capable of participating in legal proceedings. In criminal cases, in relation to the accused, the issue is usually fitness to plead and stand trial. In civil proceedings the issue is litigation capacity. As is often the case, the court’s decision is influenced by how the litigant has functioned in previous cases or earlier in the instant proceedings.

F v W [2024] IEHC 631

The detail of this case is of relevance to dental experts and attention is drawn to the clarity and particularity with which Professor Harding set out the instances of treatment of the Claimant which was below the standard she could reasonably have expected and then identified the consequences thereof. There is a gastroenterological and pharmacological dimension to the case because it was alleged, and found, that the pain resulting from the negligent dental treatment necessitated treatment with NAISDs which caused ischaemic colitis. 

Bailey v Bijlani [2025] EWHC 175 (KB)

This is primarily a case for cardiologists, cardiac nurses and anaesthetists with a learning point for psychiatric experts. Viewed from outside the jurisdiction the striking feature of the case is that the plaintiff’s general practitioner records documenting a previous psychiatric history, which she had denied when assessed by the two psychiatric experts, were not disclosed to the defendant until five days into the trial.

Tynan v Bon Secours Health System Company Ltd by Guarantee [2025] IEHC 81 

This case has a number of important features of general interest. It illustrates the importance of assessing the reliability of a subject’s account. This is not the same as advising the court as to the reliability of the subject. It is the reliability of the account that is being assessed, not the reliability of the person giving the account. This is why it is good practice to open the Opinion section of an expert report with an introductory section sometimes headed ‘Evaluation of evidence’ or sometimes ‘Clinical plausibility’. That there was no challenge to the reliability of the experts’ evidence is not surprising. They explained how they assessed the appellant and the duration of the assessments.

ZA v Cornetu District Court, Romania [2025] EWHC 595 (Admin)