It is not easy to appreciate the significance of this judgment for experts in general without reading the summary so the ‘Commentary’ is at the end. The neuropsychological test results are perhaps not of particular interest to psychologists and psychiatrists at this stage in the proceedings but may become so if the case does not settle and it goes to trial. 

Perrin v Walsh (Rev1) [2025] EWHC 2536 (KB)

The appellant is a citizen of Iraq. He appealed against the decision of a First-tier Tribunal Judge who dismissed his appeal against the respondent's decision to refuse his protection claim. The appellant raised three grounds of appeal including that the Judge failed to properly take into account the medical evidence.The Upper Tribunal found that it was clear from the Tribunal Judge's decision that he rejected the medical evidence in a comprehensive and detailed way. This was not, contrary to the grounds of appeal, the Judge ignoring the medical evidence when he was making his credibility findings. As such the Tribunal found that the Judge did not materially err as advanced, and his decision stands.

JK v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] UKAITUR UI2024003446

There are some general learning points for all experts but otherwise this is for neurosurgeons. It is another road traffic accident personal injury case in which the court needed the assistance of neurosurgeons, or at least it would have done but for the fact that it made a finding which made it unnecessary to consider the neurosurgical evidence before reaching a judgment. The nature of the injuries sustained by the claimant were not in dispute. What was in dispute, but ultimately irrelevant, was what the child’s injuries would have been if the driver of the vehicle had been driving (non-negligently) at a lower speed than he was. It was on this point that the neurosurgical experts disagreed.

MW v Wilkinson [2025] EWHC 2300 (KB) 

Familiar to all experts, this case illustrates how personal injury claimants can attempt to maximise their claim by dishonestly reporting symptoms and disabilities. There are few honest and experienced experts who can say that they have never been deceived by a personal injury claimant. The more experienced will avoid saying that the claimant appeared genuine, that they had no reason to doubt their account, or that they appeared to be honestly reporting their difficulties.

What assisted the court in this case was the findings of the experts that the claimant’s presentation was not supported by the objective findings.

This case has a more important message. An expert, having given an opinion that he has no reason to doubt a claimant’s veracity (not just a conclusion on the balance of probabilities, but beyond reasonable doubt), when he comes to change his mind, is under a duty to the court positively to make clear that he no longer holds that opinion. It is not sufficient to leave the judge to read between the lines. 

Debbie O'Connell v The Ministry of Defence [2025] EWHC 2301 (KB)

This is an important judgment for obstetricians as it shows in precise detail how the court, relying on not just the experts’ evidence but a critical analysis of the literature on which they relied, decided whether the claimant would have avoided developing HELLP had she been advised to take 75 mg aspirin at 12 (or 14) weeks instead of at 23. Twelve publications were put under the microscope and considered also in the light of research concerning the relative value of aggregate data and individual participant data.

Although the issue in this case was the prevention of HELLP, it may be an important judgment to consider in pre-eclampsia cases.

De Francisci v Hampshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (County Court, Basingstoke sitting at Southampton, 9 May 2024) Case No: F16YM828

There have been a number of cases illustrating how fractures are dated. This case illustrates the dating of haemorrhages as well as fractures. The judge’s structure of her judgment enables the reader to see how the analysis of the evidence of the various experts allowed her to find as fact how many incidents of non-accidental injury there were and when they occurred as well as with what force. Although there are no extracts from the experts’ reports or evidence, the judgment illustrates how properly presented expert medical evidence can assist the court in cases of suspected non-accidental injury. The dating of injuries can be of critical importance in cases, as here, where there was more than one potential perpetrator. 

London Borough of Y v M [2025] EWFC 232 (B) 

This is an important case for forensic odontologists because the court had to decide whether bite mark evidence was admissible. It illustrates a number of the matters that are considered when admissibility of an expert’s evidence is in issue. The single learning point is one of general application.

Hedges, R v [2025] EWCA Crim 1051

The detail of this judgment is for the specialists. It illustrates the challenges of proving that an infection has been caused by food poisoning at a hotel, and specifically the relevance of evidence as to other outbreaks in the area, trips out of the hotel, the records of illnesses suffered by other residents and audits of hotel food standards. The two learning points are oft-repeated ones and in this case of particular importance as some of the judge’s decisions depended on which expert’s evidence to accept.  

Rawson v TUI UK Ltd [2025] EWHC 2093 (KB) 

In this case of suspected non-accidental injuries to an infant, only one of the experts was required to give evidence. This was Professor Fleming and as the judge found that he gave his evidence in his characteristically understated and calm fashion and was precise, knowledgeable and reasonable in his evidence, it is set out here in full as a model.

The case also illustrates how the expertise of clinical geneticists, endocrinologists, haematologists, neonatologists, paediatricians and radiologists can all be necessary where non-accidental injury of a child is the issue.

This is an important case for three reasons.

First, it found that a general practitioner, giving evidence about the depressive disorder diagnosed in primary care, was giving expert evidence. Second, it illustrates the difficulties for courts and tribunals arising from the looseness with which some medical professionals, and most laypeople, use such terms as "depression" ("clinical" or otherwise), "anxiety" and "stress" and to which list can be added, also for the benefit of surgeons, “shock”. Third, it is a good illustration of the approach likely to be taken in an Employment Tribunal disability case.

J v DLA Piper UK LLP [2010] UKEAT 0263 09 1506